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Abstract 
Recent studies suggest that firm profits have risen to a level far above than what would 
have been earned in a competitive economy. It has been hypothesized that these profits, 
generated by market power, allow firms to influence the activity of the government. 
However, despite an abundance of theoretical investigations, the empirical examinations 
for the validity of this hypothesis have been largely neglected. Against this background, 
here we perform a detailed empirical study on the potential effects of firm profits and 
markups on government size and effectiveness. Using data on 30 European countries for a 
period of 17 years and an Instrumental Variables approach, we find that there exists a robust 
and stable negative relationship between firm gains and the activity of the state. Our results 
indicate that, even in such a homogeneous group of countries, firm power may dictate the 
decline in state activity and, successively, lead to emergence and persistence of inefficient 
states. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
As the world is facing a severe crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, government 
intervention in the form of fiscal stimuli to keep the economies afloat will undoubtedly 
reshape and redefine the role of the state in the future. Parallel to the measures taken by the 
public authorities aimed at reducing the potential impact of the health crisis, fiscal stimulus 
packages were made by governments to help the private sector in order to save jobs and 
businesses. Following the IMF’s motto - “a global crisis like no other needs a global 
response like no other”, public spending as a share of GDP is projected to rise even further, 
changing the global economic landscape to a point of no return. Over the course of history, 
movements in government spending have been shown to be very rigid - temporary 
increases proved to be permanent and decrements to a lower level highly unlikely to 
happen. This raises important questions such as: What determines the movements in 
government expenditures as percentage of GDP, i.e. state size? Are these determinants 
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 related to the quality of public good provision, competition regulation, correction for 
market failures, promotion of economic and political stability, protection from natural 
catastrophes and wars and etc., or what is simply known as government effectiveness? 
 
Without a doubt, government size and effectiveness have been at the focus of the public 
economics research community for a long period of time as the subject of many, yet still, 
ongoing debates. There have been many factors studied in the literature that have been used 
to explain cross-country differences in terms of size and efficiency of government services. 
The most dominant theories are: Wagner's Law which is concerned with the relationship 
between growth of national income and government involvement in the economy (Wagner, 
1911); Rodrik's theory of trade openness that explains government size as social insurance 
against external risks,  Rodrick (1998); Alesina and Wacziarg’s theory of country size 
which states that large countries can afford to have smaller governments because they 
already benefit from a sizable market that reduces their need to be open to trade (Alesina 
and Wacziarg, 1998); and Easterly and Ross’s demographic theory which argues that high 
ethnic diversity is closely associated with small state size (Easterly and Ross, 1997).  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no research so far has investigated the role of firm profits as 
a determinant of government size and efficiency. Our study aims to close this gap by 
including profits as an additional explanatory variable along those that have already been 
suggested in the literature to explain the variation in government activity, both across 
countries and across time.  
 
The two research hypotheses that we investigate are: i) a negative association between 
firms’ profits and government size; and also ii) a negative association between firms’ 
profits and government effectiveness. The claim that profits are negatively associated with 
government expenditure is surprising at first sight. What could be a potential explanation 
for this phenomenon? One frequently used argument in the literature is that big states have 
a negative influence on market outcomes, and this is usually explained with the presence 
of corruption and institutional weaknesses (for example, Goel and Nelson 1998, Alesina 
and Angeletos 2005, Arvate et al. 2010, and Holcombe 2013). Alternatively, one can also 
look at the profits-state size relationship through the lens of the role of firms in shaping 
political decisions related to economic issues. In general, firms aim to maximize profits 
and pay the lowest possible tax to the state. To achieve this purpose, firms may use different 
channels and try to influence political processes within a country. The lighter forms of 
influence include proposals to the chambers of commerce regarding taxes, customs duties 
or other economic policy issues. More sophisticated forms include media campaigns (with 
open or hidden participation) about the design of economic policies and lobbying of 
government officials and parliamentary members for their support. The hardest forms of 
influence include, but are not limited to financing (mostly unofficial) of political leaders, 
politicians and media, which then leads to receiving different types of favors in return.  
  
Another potential explanation for this interaction between firms and the government is 
known in the literature as “crony capitalism”. This is an economic and political system in 
which firms make profits not as a result of competition, but rather as a result of inefficient 
state allocation of subsidies, tariffs, quotas, entry and regulatory barriers etc. (Hughes 1999, 
 Wei 2001, Peev 2002, Kang 2003, Hughes et al. 2004, Rajan and Zingales 2004, Singh 
2006, James 2008, Zingales 2012, Djankov 2015, Zywicki 2015, Pei 2016, Diwan and 
Schiffbauer 2018, Ngo and Tarko 2018). One theoretical investigation of such an effect is 
presented in Acemoglu et al. (2011). The authors developed a theoretical case to explain 
the emergence and persistence of inefficient states in which elites capture democratic 
processes and keep taxation low, at the costs of aggregate inefficiencies. Indeed, we would 
expect that this is the case for less developed countries, which have only a small fraction 
of their GDP raised in tax revenue and invested by the government. But, the main logic of 
this explanation, that businesses and political elites can manipulate economic rules and 
therefore influence both state size and effectiveness, is universal, and can also apply to 
developed countries, such as countries in the European Union. 
  
Even more so, Zingales (2012) has written that: “When a business gains excessive market 
power, so that it can increase prices indiscriminately, customers can seek protection 
through the political process. But when a business obtains both market and political power, 
escape becomes impossible. Under these circumstances, the system starts to resemble a 
socialist economy instead of a free market. In a socialist economy, the political system 
controls businesses; in a crony capitalist system of this kind, businesses control the political 
process. The difference is slim: both way, competition is absent and freedom shrinks. 
Without competition, economic life becomes unfair, favoring the connected insider.”  
   
In this paper, we present empirical evidence that this argument is valid even for a relatively 
homogenous group of developed countries – European Union countries - most of which 
are required to pass through the same legislation harmonization process and have a 
common market. We find that there exists a robust and stable negative relationship between 
the magnitude of firms’ profits, measured through profit markups and profit shares, and 
countries’ government size and effectiveness. The relationship is robust in the sense that: 
(a) it is not an artifact created by outliers; and (b) it does not change under alternative model 
specifications.  
  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a comprehensive overview of the 
literature that motivated our research. Then, in Section 3, we describe the econometric 
model and the data used for verification of our hypotheses. In Section 4 we present our 
main findings. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
2 Literature review 
  
  
One of the earliest theories of public finance is Wagner’s law (Wagner, 1911) which states 
that there is a long run tendency of the relative share of the public sector to increase with 
the growth of per capita real national income. Wagner listed three main reasons for this 
upward trend of government involvement in the economy. First, the increasing societal 
complexity will require greater protective and regulatory activity by the public sector. 
Second, the growth in real income would facilitate the relative expansion of income-elastic 
expenditures on “culture and welfare”. And finally, he asserted that economic development 
and changes in technology require that the government take over the management of 
 natural monopolies in order to enhance economic efficiency (Henrekson, 1993). 
  
In terms of government size, most of the theories are focused either on the determinants of 
demand for public services or on the determinants of supply for public services (Shelton, 
2007).  Factors that are most often cited within demand-oriented theories are: national 
income, trade openness, demographic trends, ethnic fragmentation and wars. Their 
common denominator is a necessity for the state to provide insurance against various types 
of risks. 
  
Cameron (1978) was the first to use trade openness as an explanatory variable for 
government size. In a sample of 18 OECD countries, he demonstrated that trade openness 
is a strong predictor of the increase in government tax revenues as a share of GDP. The 
author suggested that more open countries have higher rates of industrial concentration, 
which tend to foster higher unionization, better collective bargaining process and stronger 
labor confederations that eventually lead to greater demand for government transfers in the 
form of social security, pensions, unemployment insurance and job training. In an extended 
sample of countries, Rodrick (1998) found a positive correlation between trade openness 
and government expenditure as a share of GDP. He denied the explanatory power of labour 
organization due to the existence of weak collective bargaining in most developing 
countries and provided an argument that government expenditures are used to provide 
social insurance against external risks. Similarly, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) introduced 
the argument for country size as a mediating factor in the “openness hypothesis”. The 
authors showed that smaller countries have a larger state size and are more open to trade, 
while large countries can afford to have smaller governments (and therefore lower taxes) 
because they already benefit from a sizable market which reduces their need to be open to 
trade. 
  
On the other hand, Easterly and Ross (1997) present another theory where demographic 
trends are the main determinant of government size. They reported that high ethnic 
diversity is closely associated with small state size and conjecture that, at least in their 
sample of African countries, interest group polarization leads to rent seeking behavior and 
reduces the consensus for public goods. In a similar fashion, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
(1999) showed that ethnic fragmentation is negatively related to local financing of 
productive public goods (education, roads, libraries, sewers and trash pickup) in US cities 
and areas, even after controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants 
(including black vs non-black heterogeneity). In a follow up study, Alesina et al. (2003) 
provided new measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization for about 190 
countries and confirmed the previously documented relationship between ethnic 
fragmentation and spending on welfare within a much broader data set. Interestingly, they 
found similar but less significant results for linguistic fragmentation and showed that 
religious fragmentation is not correlated with welfare redistribution. Their explanation of 
this finding is that religious affiliation is the most endogenous variable from the set of these 
three variables. While ethnicity and language is mostly fixed, religions can be banned and 
individuals can be motivated to ‘hide’ their religion in order to avoid repression. 
  
A detailed argumentation of the role of war, especially global, in the expansion of state size 
 and building institutional capacity can be found in Rasler and Thompson (1985). Besley 
and Persson (2008) show that civil wars decrease the state’s ability to raise revenues, while 
external wars generally lead to an increase in state capacity. However, Thies with a few 
papers (2005, 2007) argued that interstate wars in Latin America, as well as in Africa, are 
not a catalyst for state-building activities. 
  
When it comes to theories focused on the determinants of the supply of public services, the 
evolution of government expenditure is often seen through the prism of the political 
organization of a society: political participation, government type, electoral rules etc 
(Shelton, 2007). For example, Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) develop and test a general 
equilibrium model where the size of the government (measured by the share of income that 
is redistributed) depends on the relation of mean income to the income of the decisive voter 
as well as the voting rule. They find that the amount of government spending in the form 
of redistribution to aggregate income increases with the ratio of mean to median income 
and with the level of income. Persson and Tabellini (1999) connect the size of the state 
with the model of electoral system (majoritarian or proportional) and government type 
(presidential or parliamentary) within a country and find that the size of the government is 
smaller in countries with presidential regimes. Similarly, Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) 
distinguish between types of government spending (purchases of goods and transfers) and 
find that governments in countries with majoritarian systems are more focused on spending 
on public goods whereas governments in countries with proportional systems are more 
keen to spend on transfers. 
  
Along with government size, economists have also been concerned about the effectiveness 
of government services. In particular, using a sample of 154 countries, La Porta et al. 
(1999) look at economic, political and cultural factors that determine government 
performance, such as property rights indices, bureaucratic delays, school attainment, 
infrastructure quality, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, religion, latitude and many other 
variables for a large sample of countries. They find that countries with higher income, 
ethnolinguistic homogeneity, a common law system or a location further from the equator 
have better performing governments. Importantly, the authors also find that governments 
that are more effective are also larger in size and collect higher taxes. Furthermore, Alesina 
et al. (2003) construct new measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation for 
190 countries and show that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are associated with 
lower quality of government, whereas religious fractionalization is correlated with good 
governance. Ahlerup and Hansson (2011) study the association between nationalism and 
government effectiveness for a cross-section of countries and find that nationalism has an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with government effectiveness. Lee and Whitford (2009) 
make use of the World Bank Governance Indicators to analyze variation in government 
effectiveness across countries and across time to find that a significant part of it is explained 
by a country’s relative position in the worldwide income distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Model 
We specify our econometric model as:  
Governmentit = a0 + a1Profitit +a2Controlsit + αt+ βi + uit  (Eq. 1) 
where the dependent variable Governmentit is either the government size or government 
effectiveness of country i in period t. We measure the first variable as the log of the share 
of government total expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the country, whereas the 
effectiveness is quantified in raw values using the index from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators.  
To test our main hypothesis for the effect of firm profits on the dependent variables, we 
use two different quantities: i) profit shares and ii) profit markups. As will be elaborated in 
more details in the following subsection, both profit shares and markups are calculated as 
aggregate measures for the total financial gains generated by all firms within an economy.  
These variables, however, are not enough to explain government activity, and, therefore, 
in every regression we also include a set of control variables. The first of these is the Rule 
of Law in the country, which is expected to have a positive effect on government 
performance, according to La Porta et al (1999). The second is a measure of the level of 
economic development of a country and is quantified as the log of GDP per capita in 
purchasing power terms, which is included as a proxy of the Wagner hypothesis, i.e. is 
expected to have a positive effect on government activity. The third variable is the size of 
the economy, approximated through the population of the country. According to the 
previously mentioned empirical investigations, there is an inverse relationship between the 
economy and state performance, i.e., as the size of an economy increases, the government 
size and effectiveness significantly decrease (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). The last control 
variable is the openness of the country, which we measure as the log of the share of 
international trade as a percentage of GDP. More open economies are expected to have 
larger and more effective governments because of the increased income risk that greater 
openness usually entails, Ram (2009).  
Finally, in the regression specification we include time (αt) and country (βi) fixed effects, 
in order to account for possible omitted factors that are not controlled by the explanatory 
variables and may affect the dependent variables.  
There might be endogeneity in this model, because government activity can also affect firm 
profitability. Concretely, government size is directly related to government revenues, 
which are related to the taxes that the government collects, that are related to firm profits. 
Hence, bigger governments are likely to lead to lower firm profits. Government 
effectiveness, similarly, may affect firm profitability, through several channels. On the one 
hand, more effective governments are more likely to prevent tax evasion, which is likely 
to reduce firm profitability. On the other hand, more effective governments may also 
improve profitability, through better enforcement of laws and regulations and more 
effective institutions. 
 To address this potential endogeneity, one needs to find a way to isolate the changes in 
firm profitability which are unrelated to government activity. One standard way to do this 
is through a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. 2SLS is able to 
overcome the endogeneity problem by instrumenting firm profits in the first stage of the 
procedure with variables that are unrelated to government activity: 
Governmentit = b0 + b1Profitit +b2Controlsit + γt+δi + uit  (Eq. 2) 
Profitit = c0 + c1Instrumentit +c2Controlsit + μt+ νi + eit  (Eq. 3) 
The task of finding good instruments is never easy, and here we propose three instruments 
- oil prices, exchange rates and minimum wages. All of these variables are likely to be 
related to firm profits - oil prices constitute an important part of firm expenses and are thus 
likely to reduce firm profits, minimum wages are likely to affect wages in general and 
through this firm profits as well, while exchange rates determine the price of products on 
foreign markets and through this affect firm demand as well as their profits. At the same 
time, they are not directly related to government size or effectiveness, and can be 
considered exogenous in this setup.  
 
3.2 Derivation of profit markups 
Theoretically, in any economic framework that allows firms to set their final prices with a 
markup over their costs, economic profits are different from zero. One can argue that, when 
everything else is considered, a higher gap between additional costs of producing an extra 
unit of output (marginal cost) and the final price for that extra unit of output set by a firm, 
also leads to greater pricing power of the firm and its ability to generate profit. Intuitively, 
the price-setting behavior of firms unveils the degree of competition within the economy 
that can also depend on government regulation (among other factors, such as the industry 
type, openness to trade etc). However, markups are genuinely difficult to measure because, 
by definition, they rely on data for marginal costs which are not directly observed. To 
overcome this difficulty, several approaches have been suggested in the literature. Some of 
these approaches include the use of micro data or firm level data (De Loecker and 
Warzynski, 2012; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2018) or aggregate macro data (Macallan, 
Millard and Parker, 2008; Balakrishnan and Lopez-Salido, 2002). Here, we obtain an 
approximation of profit markups by estimating the ratio between the deflator of gross value 
added and unit labour costs, which captures the relation between final prices and marginal 
costs in an economy (Bank of Spain, 2019). The gross value-added deflator is calculated 
as the ratio between nominal value added and real value added, while the unit labour cost 
is calculated as the ratio between compensation of employees and their productivity. 
 
3.3 Derivation of profit shares 
Firm profits can be obtained from macro-data (national accounts) and micro-data 
(corporate accounts). Due to their methodological consistency across countries and time, 
we follow Katsimi and Sarandites (2011) and use data from national accounts. The amount 
of profits generated within an economy can be obtained by decomposing the domestic 
output into types of factor income that arise from the final production of goods and services. 
 The profit share is then calculated using aggregates from the national accounts of each 
country included in the sample, as a ratio between the gross operating surplus and mixed 
income and the market value of total output.  
 
3.4 Data 
The main sources for the data used in our analysis are the World Economic Outlook 2019 
database from the IMF and the World Bank main database. Specifically, as a proxy for 
government size we used data on General government total expenditure (% of GDP), while 
the data for the second dependent variable, Government Effectiveness, is taken from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The independent variables, profit 
shares and profit markups, were calculated using Eurostat data, as described in the previous 
two subsections.  
The annual data cover the period from 2002 to 2018 for 30 countries, yielding a balanced 
panel with 510 observations. These countries are geographically located in Europe, 28 of 
them are EU member states as of 2018, 2 are EFTA countries, 11 are non-euro and 19 euro-
area countries. On the other hand, when performing 2SLS estimation (instrumental variable 
regressions) the observations drop to 355 due to missing data on statutory minimum wage. 
This data is not reported for countries for which minimum wage is set by collective 
agreements instead of by national laws. The instruments used in our analysis are the 
minimum wage in 2017 PPP USD collected from the ILOSTAT database, the nominal 
exchange rate, expressed as local currency units per US$ from the World Bank and oil 
shock calculated as a product of oil prices and oil share in a country’s imports. Oil prices 
are averages for Brent, WTI and Dubai Fateh, taken from the IMF, while oil imports are 
from UN Comtrade. The data for the remaining control variables, such as GDP p.c. PPP, 
Trade (% of GDP), population, is collected from the above mentioned sources. Data 
sources, variable descriptions and their abbreviations are presented in more detail in Table 
1(a). 
 
Table 1(b) shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. Table 1(c) lists 
the mean values of the included variables over the studied period for each country. As we 
can see from Table 1(c), given the range and standard deviation, the cross-country 
differences are approximately the same in terms of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables of interest, profit shares and markups. France is the country with the 
highest ratio of government expenditure to GDP, followed by Denmark, Finland and 
Belgium, whereas Switzerland has the lowest ratio. Mean profit share is highest in Greece, 
Romania and Ireland, and lowest in Sweden, Denmark and France. The mean markups, on 
the other hand, are largest in Slovakia, followed by Ireland and Czech Republic. 
Switzerland is the country with the lowest mean value for the markups. Overall, it seems 
that countries with higher profit share and markups tend to have lower government size. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 (a) about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 ---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 (b) about here 
---------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 (c) about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
We begin the analysis with a graphical representation of the correlation between 
government activity and firm profits. Figure 1 shows the scatter plots of these variables for 
the 28 analysed countries. The top left panel shows the correlation between government 
size and the profit share, the top right panel between government size and profit markup, 
the bottom left between government effectiveness and the profit share and the bottom right 
between government effectiveness and profit markup. All the scatter plots reveal a clear 
negative association between government activity and firm profits - as firm profits increase, 
government activity tends to decline. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between government activity and firm profitability. 
Sources: IMF’s World Economic Outlook database for the general government expenditures, as percentage 
of GDP; World Bank’s World Governance Indicators for government effectiveness; Profit share and profit 
markup as explained in the text.  
 4.2 OLS results 
We next present the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results of the model shown in Eq. 1. 
Besides being the simplest estimation procedure, OLS also provides consistent, unbiased 
and efficient in situations when there is exogeneity among regressors and the errors are 
homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. Even though the exogeneity assumption is 
unlikely to hold in our case, the OLS has been the most frequently used method for studying 
the determinants of the government size and effectiveness - see for example Shelton 
(2007), Ram (2009) and Beekman (2014). To account for the potential problem of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, the standard errors of each coefficient are 
corrected by implementing the clustered standard errors procedure. Table 2 reports these 
results, where the dependent variable in the regressions is shown in the heading row.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Columns (1) and (2) show the results where the dependent variable is the government size, 
columns (3) and (4) where the dependent variable is the government effectiveness. We 
observe that both profit shares and markups exhibit a negative marginal effect on 
government size and effectiveness. In the government size regressions, the effects are 
highly significant statistically. A 1% increase in the profit share results in an average 
decrease in the government size of 0.6% and a reduction in the government effectiveness 
of 0.4 units, while an increase in the level of markups is associated with an average decrease 
in the government size of 0.5% and a decrease of government effectiveness of 0.2 units. 
As for the control variables, the rule of law is significant in all the regressions, with a 
positive sign, implying that countries with a better rule of law have bigger and more 
effective governments. GDP per capita is also significant in all of the regressions, with 
negative coefficients in the size regressions, and positive in the effectiveness regressions. 
The negative sign in the size regressions is against the Wagner law, as it implies that more 
developed countries actually have smaller governments. The positive sign in the 
government effectiveness regressions is as expected, as it implies that more developed 
countries have more effective governments. Population is negative in all regressions, 
although significant in only a few, implying that bigger countries have smaller and less 
effective governments, as expected. Trade, finally, is insignificant in all regressions, which 
might be explained by the similarity of the analysed countries.  
 
4.3 2SLS results 
 
As emphasized in Acemoglu et al. (2011) the relationship between firm profits and state 
activity may be endogenous. In this case the ordinary OLS estimator provides biased 
estimates and, hence, it is not suitable to quantify the effect of private sector profits on the 
 state activity. As a means to solve this potential problem, as explained above, we propose 
a 2SLS estimation, where firm profits are instrumented by oil prices, exchange rates and 
minimum wages. Table 3 presents the 2SLS estimation of Eq. 2 and 3, where the 
dependent variable is the government size.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show the results for the profit share, where column (2) 
shows the first stage regression, while column (1) the second stage regression. From the 
first stage regression, it can be seen that the three instruments are all strong in explaining 
the dynamics of the profit share – they are all highly significant and with expected signs. 
The minimum wage and the oil prices are negative, implying that when they increase, firm 
profits decline, while the exchange rate is positive, meaning that when the exchange rate 
depreciates vs. the USD, firm profits increase, due to the higher foreign demand. The F test 
for the significance of the three variables is 23.2, way higher than the rule of thumb value 
of 10, meaning that the instruments are not weak. From the second stage regression, it can 
be seen that the profit share is now even stronger than in the OLS estimation – its 
coefficient is around 1 and highly significant, implying that a 1% increase in the profit 
share results in an average decrease in the government size of 1%. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show the results for the profit markup. These results are 
very similar to the previous. The three instruments from the first stage regression are strong 
predictors for the profit markups – all of them are individually significant at 1%, with the 
expected signs, and the F test value for their joint significance is 26.1. Then, in the second 
stage regression, the markup is highly significant for the government size and with a bigger 
coefficient than in the OLS estimation (-0.6), implying that if markups increase by 1%, 
government size declines by 0.6%. 
When the control variables are in question, their coefficients in the 2SLS estimates are very 
similar to the previously elaborated OLS results. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 4 presents the 2SLS results for government effectiveness. Columns (1) and (2) show 
the results for the profit share, while columns (3) and (4) for the profit markup. The first 
stage regressions in both cases are very similar to the government size results – the three 
instruments turn out to be strong predictors of the profit shares and profit markups. Then, 
the second stage regressions indicate that the effects of the profit variables on government 
effectiveness are again negative, significant and stronger than in the OLS case – 1% 
 increase in the profit share leads to a decline in government effectiveness by 1 unit, while 
1% increase in the profit markup declines the government effectiveness by 0.7 units. 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
 
We conduct several robustness checks. First, we reduce the sample of estimation by 
eliminating several first and last years from the sample. Next, we reduce the sample by 
removing the observations with the lowest and highest values. Then, we reduce the 
instrument set to two variables instead of three. Finally, we change the specification of our 
model by including two additional explanatory variables: the fraction of elderly population 
in the country and the control of corruption. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions with reduced number of years, for government 
size. The first three columns show the results where the explanatory variable is the profit 
share, the last three columns for the profit markups. The first of these columns presents 
results where the first several years of the sample are excluded, the second of the columns 
- where the last several years are excluded, and the third - where both first and last couple 
of years are excluded. In all the cases around 20% of the observations are excluded. The 
exact time periods are indicated in the heading rows of the table. It can be seen that the 
coefficients on the profit variables remain similar as before - highly significant and 
negative, even with slightly higher magnitude than previously. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 6 shows the results with reduced number of years, for government effectiveness. The 
columns are the same as before - the first three columns show the results where the 
explanatory variable is the profit share, the last three columns show the results for profit 
markups. Again, results remain very stable - profit variables are negative and highly 
significant, and on some occasions even with a stronger magnitude than in the baseline 
regressions. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
We next present the results when the observations with lowest and highest values for the 
government activity and firm profits variables are excluded from the sample, in Table 7. 
The coefficients for the profit variables remain roughly the same as before in magnitude, 
just the significance of the profit variables in the government effectiveness regressions 
declines. 
 
 ---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
We continue the robustness check by reducing the instrument set to to two variables, 
instead of all of the three variables. Table 8 shows the results for government size, table 9 
for government effectiveness. The first three columns of the two tables show the results for 
the profit share variables, the last three for the profit markup. The instrument set is 
indicated in the heading row of the tables. It can be seen that results remain largely 
unchanged - in Table 8, the profit variables are always highly significant and with 
coefficients similar to the baseline ones. In Table 9, the profit variables are insignificant 
just in the cases where the instrument set consists of the oil prices and the minimum wage. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, we change the model specification and investigate if our model is robust to 
omission of significant explanatory variables. For this purpose we include two additional 
variables in the model. First, we include the log of the fraction of the population above 65 
in the country. This variable is a proxy of the demographic constitution of the country. It 
is known that the demographics play an important role in the production of the long-run 
government supply and demand. Concretely, the aging population should exert a positive 
influence on the government spending by increasing the expenditures for social security 
and medical care, thus additionally affecting the effectiveness of the government, (Shelton, 
2007) and Lee and Lin (1994). Second, we add the corruption variable from WGI. The 
control of corruption “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption”. By definition the 
control of corruption evaluates the condition of the state with respect to being captured by 
elites and private interests. Therefore, it may serve as an alternate measure for the 
magnitude of crony capitalism in an economy to our profit quantities. The results are 
displayed in Table 10. In each specification, the markups and profit shares remain 
significant explanatory variables with negative marginal effect. Out of the newly specified 
explanatory variables, the aging population is significant only when the government 
effectiveness is the dependent variable. Similarly, the control of corruption appears in 
certain cases (at 10% level), though its marginal effect varies. In fact, there are cases when 
it has the incorrect sign, i.e., a larger control for corruption also implies a larger 
government, which is contrary to the definition of crony capitalism, Kotera et al (2012). 
  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
To conclude, the robustness analysis supports the previous findings, that firm profits 
exhibit a sizable and significant negative effect on government activity. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We investigated the potential impact of firm profits on government size and effectiveness 
for a panel of European countries. This was done by considering countrywise aggregated 
indices of profit shares and margins as measures for the level of firm gains within an 
economy. By utilizing simple regression techniques, we showed that profits have a 
significant negative effect on government size and effectiveness. To test the validity of our 
findings, a series of robustness checks was performed which take into account the possible 
presence of outliers and the relevant instrument selection. All of these approaches 
confirmed our initial results. Hence, the discovered pattern is non-trivial and may play a 
major role in shaping the state activity.  
 
We conjectured several possible explanations for the direction and the magnitude of the 
relationship between firm profits and government size and its effectiveness. Among these 
conjectures was the role of firms in shaping political decisions related to economic issues. 
Another possible explanation was the effect of crony capitalism, i.e., the presence of an 
economic system in which businesses thrive not as a result of risk, but rather as a return on 
money amassed through a nexus between a business class and the political class. By 
definition, crony capitalism is directly related to the presence of corruption within a state, 
but may not necessarily represent a synonymous concept. In this aspect, we believe the 
observation that our measures of firm gains offer a more plausible explanation for the effect 
of firm power on government activity. 
 
But apart from the increase in profits from a macroeconomic perspective, another trend 
that is worth mentioning is the increase in profit concentration within a relatively small 
number of companies. In a 2015 report by the McKinsey Global Institute, it was reported 
that 10% of the world’s publicly listed companies make around 80% of all the profits. 
According to The Economist, this “superstar effect” - observed for large and global 
companies - is most visible in the United States.  This has also been confirmed in the 
literature for some of the largest economies in the world, but mostly for the US (De Loecker 
and Eeckhout, 2017; Grullon, Larkin and Michaely, 2015; Bessen, 2016; Philippon, 
2019,1). In fact, using an example for the telecommunications industry, Philippon (2019,2) 
explains that the relationship between competition and concentration arises from rent-
seeking behavior among big firms that continuously lobby to increase their profits. Autor 
et al. (2019) show that the increase in the aggregate markup comes through as a result of 
 an increase in the market share of big companies, or “superstar firms” with the use of 
micro-data. Finally, using industry-level data, Barkai (2017) studied the shares of labor, 
capital and profits and their interaction with market competition to find that increases in 
market concentration occur simultaneously with a decline in the labor share and an increase 
in the profit share. In this context, further analysis of the correlation and/or causality 
between the trend of increasing profits and the trend of increasing concentration of profits 
within a few companies/industries represents an interesting direction for future research. 
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 Variable Code Definition Data Source Observations 
General 
government total 
expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
gov_size Total expenditure consists of total 
expense and the net acquisition of 
nonfinancial assets. 
World Economic Outlook Database, 
IMF 
510 
GDP per capita, 
constant prices 
PPP; 2011 
international 
dollars 
gdp_ppp_pc GDP is expressed in constant 
international dollars per person. Data 
are derived by dividing constant price 
purchasing-power parity (PPP) GDP 
by total population. 
World Economic Outlook Database, 
IMF 
510 
Population 
(persons) 
pop For census purposes, the total 
population of the country consists of 
all persons falling within the scope of 
the census. 
World Economic Outlook Database, 
IMF 
510 
Population ages 
65 and above (% 
of total 
population) 
pop65 Population ages 65 and above as a % 
of the total population. Population is 
based on the de facto definition of 
population, which counts all residents 
regardless of legal status or 
citizenship. 
World Development Indicators 
Database, World Bank 
510 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
trade Trade is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic 
product. 
World Development Indicators 
Database, World Bank 
510 
Government 
Effectiveness 
gov_eff Government Effectiveness captures 
perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such 
policies.  
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Database, World Bank 
510 
Rule of Law rule_of_law Rule of Law captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Database, World Bank 
510 
Control of 
Corruption 
corruption_control Control of Corruption captures 
perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Database, World Bank 
510 
DEC alternative 
conversion 
factor (LCU per 
US$) 
e_rate The DEC alternative conversion factor 
is the underlying annual exchange rate 
used for the World Bank Atlas 
method. It is expressed in local 
currency units per U.S. dollar. 
World Development Indicators 
Database, World Bank 
510 
Statutory 
nominal gross 
monthly 
minimum wage, 
2017 USD PPP 
minw Data refer to the minimum monthly 
earnings of all employees as of 
December 31st of each year. 
Minimum wages are not reported for 
countries for which collective 
bargaining is in place for minimum 
wages. 
International Labour Organization, 
ILOSTAT 
355 
Profit share profits The profit share is calculated using 
aggregates from the National 
Accounts of each country included in 
the sample, as a ratio between the 
gross operating surplus and mixed 
income and the market value of total 
output. 
Annual Macroeconomic database of the 
European Commission (AMECO)  
510 
Profit markups markups Profit markups are calculated by 
estimating  the ratio between the 
deflator of gross value added and unit 
Bank of Spain, Quarterly Report on the 
Spanish Economy, Q2 2019, Box 4: 
510 
 labour costs, which captures the 
relation between final prices and 
marginal costs in an economy (Bank 
of Spain, 2019). The gross value-
added deflator is calculated as the 
ratio between nominal value added 
and real value added, while the unit 
labour cost is calculated as the ratio 
between compensation of employees 
and their productivity. 
Recent developments in Euro Area 
Labour Costs and Markups 
Oil shock oil_shock Calculated as a product of oil prices 
and oil share in each country’s 
imports. Oil prices are the average for 
the Brent, West Texas Intermediate 
and Dubai Fateh. Oil imports refer to 
tariff code 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral 
oils and products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; mineral 
waxes. 
Oil prices - IMF; Imports - UN 
Comtrade. 
510 
Table 1. (a) Data sources and description. 
 
Statistic e_rate gov_si
ze 
profits markups gdp_ppp_p
c 
pop trad
e 
gov_ef
f 
rule_of_la
w 
oil_shoc
k 
minw corruptio
n_control 
pop65 
Observation
s 
510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 355 510 510 
Mean 10.02 0.44 0.43 1.20 35698.99 17.09 1.16 1.19 1.18 8.10 911.87 1.10 0.17 
Std. Dev. 40.91 0.07 0.06 0.13 15761.99 21.97 0.64 0.61 0.63 6.78 481.87 0.81 0.03 
Minimum 0.50 0.25 0.31 0.93 10738.43 0.40 0.45 -0.36 -0.26 0.33 150.92 -0.44 0.10 
1st quartile 0.75 0.39 0.39 1.10 24977.11 4.24 0.71 0.73 0.75 3.48 516.31 0.37 0.15 
Median 0.89 0.44 0.42 1.19 33824.67 8.23 1.01 1.16 1.17 6.17 825.21 1.06 0.17 
3rd quartile 3.04 0.49 0.49 1.29 42816.03 16.55 1.42 1.73 1.78 10.86 1278.1
0 
1.88 0.18 
Maximum 281.52 0.65 0.64 1.85 98537.42 82.90 4.08 2.35 2.10 47.37 2084.7
1 
2.47 0.23 
Table 1. (b) Sample summary statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Country e_rate gov_siz
e 
profits markups gdp_ppp_p
c 
pop trade gov_eff rule_of
_law 
oil_shock minw corruptio
n_control 
pop65 
Austria 0.81 0.51 0.41 1.16 43400.61 8.42 0.99 1.69 1.86 5.21 / 1.71 0.18 
Belgium 0.81 0.52 0.39 1.04 40651.05 10.86 1.52 1.57 1.38 7.74 1553.1
4 
1.49 0.18 
Bulgaria 1.59 0.34 0.50 1.26 15865.50 7.44 1.13 0.14 -0.08 9.74 343.16 -0.15 0.19 
Croatia 6.04 0.48 0.36 1.07 20338.37 4.31 0.85 0.54 0.17 9.74 721.49 0.14 0.18 
Cyprus 0.81 0.40 0.41 1.20 34292.89 0.80 1.21 1.25 1.02 13.58 / 1.01 0.12 
Czech Republic 22.38 0.42 0.51 1.33 28014.22 10.40 1.32 0.95 0.98 4.13 564.39 0.40 0.16 
Denmark 6.04 0.53 0.34 1.14 43795.09 5.54 0.97 2.07 1.94 4.78 / 2.34 0.17 
Estonia 0.81 0.38 0.42 1.25 24404.56 1.34 1.43 1.03 1.14 8.96 483.74 1.10 0.18 
Finland 0.81 0.53 0.40 1.17 39430.91 5.35 0.76 2.09 1.98 10.00 / 2.29 0.18 
France 0.81 0.55 0.35 1.10 38398.77 62.59 0.57 1.51 1.44 7.78 1518.3
3 
1.38 0.18 
Germany 0.81 0.46 0.39 1.11 41940.35 81.27 0.79 1.61 1.69 6.02 1824.3
5 
1.83 0.20 
Greece 0.81 0.49 0.54 1.23 28099.30 10.96 0.58 0.52 0.56 15.96 980.84 0.09 0.19 
Hungary 226.40 0.49 0.41 1.30 23489.63 9.98 1.52 0.69 0.74 4.31 576.69 0.40 0.17 
Ireland 0.81 0.37 0.53 1.43 50700.50 4.49 1.81 1.49 1.66 6.42 1380.9
5 
1.58 0.12 
Italy 0.81 0.49 0.48 1.20 35674.16 59.35 0.53 0.47 0.45 8.58 / 0.24 0.21 
Latvia 0.79 0.37 0.47 1.30 20258.35 2.12 1.08 0.76 0.75 7.30 442.18 0.31 0.18 
Lithuania 0.81 0.35 0.48 1.31 22662.02 3.11 1.28 0.82 0.78 15.06 486.97 0.38 0.17 
Luxembourg 0.81 0.42 0.40 1.21 91974.34 0.51 3.35 1.73 1.82 6.88 1759.9
5 
1.99 0.14 
Malta 0.81 0.41 0.45 1.28 30882.25 0.42 2.73 1.06 1.36 17.18 996.27 0.85 0.16 
Netherlands 0.81 0.44 0.41 1.09 46292.09 16.60 1.36 1.84 1.82 10.86 1591.3
7 
2.04 0.16 
Norway 6.76 0.45 0.45 1.33 63603.31 4.92 0.70 1.90 1.96 3.22 / 2.12 0.15 
Poland 3.35 0.43 0.50 1.28 21343.84 38.09 0.85 0.59 0.61 6.25 689.45 0.50 0.14 
Portugal 0.81 0.47 0.41 1.14 26681.16 10.46 0.72 1.10 1.12 8.74 767.51 1.03 0.19 
Romania 3.30 0.34 0.54 1.22 17181.16 20.54 0.71 -0.23 0.04 5.56 394.27 -0.19 0.16 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.81 0.41 0.53 1.44 24545.66 5.40 1.63 0.82 0.52 5.41 494.47 0.26 0.13 
Slovenia 0.81 0.43 0.37 1.03 28501.99 2.03 1.33 1.03 1.00 6.63 975.09 0.89 0.17 
Spain 0.81 0.42 0.44 1.14 33128.23 45.35 0.59 1.18 1.10 10.15 914.14 1.00 0.18 
Sweden 7.60 0.50 0.33 1.29 43373.75 9.47 0.84 1.93 1.93 7.73 / 2.21 0.18 
Switzerland 1.10 0.32 0.39 0.98 54012.23 7.82 1.12 1.98 1.87 3.16 / 2.08 0.17 
United 
Kingdom 
0.63 0.40 0.39 1.09 38033.39 62.78 0.57 1.63 1.71 5.97 1232.9
5 
1.80 0.17 
Table 1. (c) Mean values of the studied variables per country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 
VARIABLES gov_size gov_size gov_eff gov_eff 
 
profits (log) 
 
-0.560*** 
(0.169) 
 
 
-0.368 
(0.284) 
 
markups (log) 
 
-0.505*** 
(0.180)  
-0.195 
(0.159) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) -0.309*** 
(0.098) 
-0.337*** 
(0.089) 
0.355** 
(0.145) 
0.330** 
(0.129) 
trade (log) -0.015 
(0.109) 
-0.010 
(0.106) 
0.223 
(0.221) 
0.198 
(0.225) 
pop (log) -0.145 
(0.123) 
-0.248*** 
(0.087) 
-0.462 
(0.341) 
-0.549* 
(0.311) 
rule_of_law 0.095* 
(0.049) 
0.091** 
(0.042) 
0.422*** 
(0.073) 
0.429*** 
(0.074) 
Constant 2.098** 
(0.919) 
3.185*** 
(0.869) 
-2.491 
(2.219) 
-1.698 
(1.763) 
 
Observations 510 510 510 510 
 
R-squared 0.518 0.533 0.386 0.381 
 
Number of countries 30 30 30 30 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                   
                  Table 2: OLS results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Second stage First stage Second stage First stage 
VARIABLES gov_size profits gov_size markups 
profits (log) 
 
-0.998*** 
(0.187) 
   
markups (log) 
   
-0.581*** 
(0.114) 
 
minw (log)  -0.116*** 
(0.022) 
 -0.170*** 
(0.027) 
e_rate (log)  0.172*** 
(0.044) 
 0.303*** 
(0.056) 
oil_shock (log)  -0.038*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.063*** 
(0.010) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) -0.279*** 
(0.048) 
0.225*** 
(0.033) 
-0.357*** 
(0.041) 
0.229*** 
(0.042) 
trade (log) -0.042 
(0.059) 
0.139*** 
(0.035) 
-0.043 
(0.059) 
0.241*** 
(0.045) 
pop (log) 0.108 
(0.124) 
0.353*** 
(0.063) 
-0.256*** 
(0.083) 
0.021 
(0.080) 
rule_of_law 0.083*** 
(0.027) 
-0.068*** 
(0.018) 
0.089*** 
(0.026) 
-0.108*** 
(0.023) 
Observations 355 355 355 355 
R-squared 0.567 
 
0.593 
 
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 
F test for instruments 53.35  76.73  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3: 2SLS results for government size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Second stage First stage Second stage First stage 
VARIABLES gov_eff profits gov_eff markups 
profits (log) 
 
-0.976** 
(0.409) 
 
  
markups (log) 
 
  
-0.672*** 
(0.252) 
 
minw (log)  -0.116*** 
(0.022) 
 -0.170*** 
(0.027) 
e_rate (log)  0.172*** 
(0.044) 
 0.303*** 
(0.056) 
oil_shock (log)  -0.038*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.063*** 
(0.010) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) 0.511*** 
(0.105) 
0.225*** 
(0.033) 
0.445*** 
(0.091) 
0.229*** 
(0.042) 
trade (log) 0.506*** 
(0.129) 
0.139*** 
(0.035) 
0.534*** 
(0.129) 
0.241*** 
(0.045) 
pop (log) -0.177 
(0.271) 
0.353*** 
(0.063) 
-0.508*** 
(0.184) 
0.021 
(0.080) 
rule_of_law 0.313*** 
(0.059) 
-0.068*** 
(0.018) 
0.309*** 
(0.057) 
-0.108*** 
(0.023) 
Observations 355 355 355 355 
R-squared 0.443 
 
0.464 
 
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 
F test for instruments 53.35  76.73  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
          Table 4: 2SLS results for government effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
After 2005 Before 
2016 
After 2004 and Before 
2017 
After 
2005 
Before 
2016 
After 2004 and Before 
2017 
VARIABLES 
 
gov_size gov_size gov_size gov_size gov_size gov_size 
profits (log) -1.609*** 
(0.215) 
-0.960*** 
(0.312) 
-1.637*** 
(0.297) 
   
markups (log)    -1.032*** 
(0.126) 
-0.538*** 
(0.177) 
-0.926*** 
(0.154) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) -0.214*** 
(0.073) 
-0.328*** 
(0.062) 
-0.226*** 
(0.084) 
-0.384*** 
(0.054) 
-0.379*** 
(0.056) 
-0.417*** 
(0.060) 
trade (log) 0.215** 
(0.087) 
-0.032 
(0.073) 
0.289*** 
(0.106) 
0.217*** 
(0.078) 
-0.047 
(0.069) 
0.210** 
(0.085) 
pop (log) 0.609*** 
(0.164) 
-0.137 
(0.143) 
0.326* 
(0.176) 
0.110 
(0.113) 
-0.412*** 
(0.115) 
-0.180 
(0.122) 
rule_of_law -0.002 
(0.036) 
0.107*** 
(0.034) 
0.014 
(0.040) 
0.008 
(0.032) 
0.105*** 
(0.033) 
0.038 
(0.033) 
Observations 275 288 251 275 288 251 
R-squared 0.544 0.494 0.417 0.646 0.532 0.577 
Number of countries 22 21 22 22 21 22 
F test for instruments 49.81 26.45 34.50 67.85 45.12 56.88 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 5: Results for government size with reduced number of years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 After 2005 Before 
2016 
After 2004 and Before 
2017 
After 
2005 
Before 
2016 
After 2004 and Before 
2017 
VARIABLES gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff 
  
            
profits (log) -0.617* 
(0.373) 
-1.448** 
(0.673) 
-1.052** 
(0.507) 
   
markups (log)    -0.516** 
(0.245) 
-0.964** 
(0.381) 
-0.765** 
(0.299) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) 0.335*** 
(0.127) 
0.461*** 
(0.134) 
0.462*** 
(0.144) 
0.290*** 
(0.105) 
0.388*** 
(0.121) 
0.355*** 
(0.115) 
trade (log) 0.204 
(0.151) 
0.580*** 
(0.158) 
0.404** 
(0.182) 
0.254* 
(0.151) 
0.591*** 
(0.149) 
0.417** 
(0.165) 
pop (log) -0.492* 
(0.284) 
-0.421 
(0.309) 
-0.628** 
(0.301) 
-0.643*** 
(0.219) 
-0.844*** 
(0.246) 
-0.941*** 
(0.237) 
rule_of_law 0.346*** 
(0.063) 
0.379*** 
(0.072) 
0.327*** 
(0.069) 
0.335*** 
(0.062) 
0.367*** 
(0.070) 
0.329*** 
(0.065) 
Observations 275 288 251 275 288 251 
R-squared 0.334 0.378 0.309 0.352 0.428 0.353 
Number of countries 22 21 22 22 21 22 
F test for instruments 49.81 26.45 34.50 67.85 45.12 56.88 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 6: Results for government effectiveness with reduced number of years 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
VARIABLES 
Gov. size + Profit 
share 
Gov. size + Profit 
markup 
Gov. eff. + Profit share Gov. eff. + Profit markup 
  
        
profits (log) -1.315*** 
(0.273) 
 -0.919 
(0.694) 
 
markups (log)  -0.743*** 
(0.156) 
 -0.740 
(0.515) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) -0.320*** 
(0.047) 
-0.338*** 
(0.038) 
0.515*** 
(0.110) 
0.487*** 
(0.107) 
trade (log) -0.087 
(0.056) 
-0.090* 
(0.049) 
0.580*** 
(0.136) 
0.625*** 
(0.137) 
pop (log) 0.139 
(0.117) 
-0.172** 
(0.072) 
-0.233 
(0.277) 
-0.583*** 
(0.197) 
rule_of_law 0.013 
(0.032) 
0.049** 
(0.024) 
0.355*** 
(0.078) 
0.310*** 
(0.076) 
Observations 305 300 308 300 
R-squared 0.416 0.581 0.433 0.483 
Number of countries 22 22 21 21 
F test for instruments 32.14 45.40 27.98 39.73 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7: Results with low and high values for the variables excluded 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Minimum 
wage + 
Exchange rate 
Oil prices + 
Exchange 
rate 
Oil prices + 
Minimum 
wage 
Minimum wage + 
Exchange rate 
Oil prices + 
Exchange rate 
Oil prices + 
Minimum wage 
VARIABLES gov_size gov_size gov_size gov_size gov_size gov_size 
  
            
profits (log) -1.136*** 
(0.247) 
-0.518* 
(0.273) 
-1.370*** 
(0.241) 
   
markups (log)    -0.658*** 
(0.151) 
-0.335** 
(0.162) 
-0.868*** 
(0.148) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) -0.261*** 
(0.054) 
-0.313*** 
(0.044) 
-0.230*** 
(0.056) 
-0.350*** 
(0.043) 
-0.346*** 
(0.037) 
-0.330*** 
(0.045) 
trade (log) -0.018 
(0.066) 
-0.023 
(0.062) 
0.021 
(0.069) 
-0.021 
(0.065) 
-0.046 
(0.051) 
0.039 
(0.067) 
pop (log) 0.178 
(0.150) 
-0.158 
(0.110) 
0.295* 
(0.151) 
-0.238*** 
(0.088) 
-0.272*** 
(0.073) 
-0.189** 
(0.092) 
rule_of_law 0.074** 
(0.030) 
0.097*** 
(0.026) 
0.058* 
(0.031) 
0.081*** 
(0.028) 
0.103*** 
(0.023) 
0.060** 
(0.029) 
Observations 355 510 355 355 510 355 
R-squared 0.537 0.517 0.466 0.582 0.521 0.527 
Number of countries 22 30 22 22 30 22 
F test for instruments 32.81 21.85 39.78 45.07 43.43 52.85 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 8: Results for government size with alternative instrument set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Minimum 
wage + 
Exchange 
rate 
Oil prices + 
Exchange rate 
Oil prices + 
Minimum wage 
Minimum 
wage + 
Exchange rate 
Oil prices + 
Exchange 
rate 
Oil prices + 
Minimum wage 
VARIABLES gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff gov_eff 
  
            
profits (log) -1.256** 
(0.534) 
-1.588** 
(0.700) 
-0.190 
(0.461) 
   
markups (log)    -0.919*** 
(0.336) 
-0.910** 
(0.403) 
-0.134 
(0.301) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) 0.548*** 
(0.116) 
0.470*** 
(0.113) 
0.407*** 
(0.107) 
0.468*** 
(0.095) 
0.365*** 
(0.091) 
0.394*** 
(0.091) 
trade (log) 0.552*** 
(0.144) 
0.444*** 
(0.159) 
0.374*** 
(0.132) 
0.605*** 
(0.146) 
0.349*** 
(0.127) 
0.381*** 
(0.137) 
pop (log) -0.036 
(0.324) 
-0.084 
(0.282) 
-0.571** 
(0.289) 
-0.450** 
(0.195) 
-0.449** 
(0.183) 
-0.635*** 
(0.187) 
rule_of_law 0.295*** 
(0.064) 
0.355*** 
(0.066) 
0.365*** 
(0.059) 
0.284*** 
(0.063) 
0.381*** 
(0.058) 
0.363*** 
(0.059) 
Observations 355 510 355 355 510 355 
R-squared 0.414 0.287 0.470 0.439 0.332 0.473 
Number of countries 22 30 22 22 30 22 
F test for instruments 32.81 21.85 39.78 45.07 43.43 52.85 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  Table 9: Results for government effectiveness with alternative instrument set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Second 
stage 
First 
stage 
Second 
stage 
First 
stage 
Second 
stage 
First 
stage 
Second 
stage 
First 
stage 
VARIABLES gov_size profits gov_size markups gov_eff profits gov_eff markups 
  
                
profits (log) -0.986***    -1.185***    
 
(0.183)    (0.398)    
markups (log)   -0.582***    -0.778***  
 
  (0.112)    (0.243)  
minw (log)  
-
0.123**
*  
-
0.181**
*  
-
0.123**
*  
-
0.181**
* 
 
 (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.029) 
e_rate (log)  
0.160**
*  
0.290**
*  
0.160**
*  
0.290**
* 
 
 (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.045)  (0.057) 
oil_shock (log)  
-
0.039**
*  
-
0.062**
*  
-
0.039**
*  
-
0.062**
* 
 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
gdp_ppp_pc (log) -0.242*** 
0.252**
* -0.323*** 
0.258**
* 0.362*** 
0.252**
* 0.273*** 
0.258**
* 
 
(0.051) (0.038) (0.044) (0.048) (0.111) (0.038) (0.096) (0.048) 
trade (log) -0.037 
0.142**
* -0.035 
0.244**
* 0.505*** 
0.142**
* 0.529*** 
0.244**
* 
 
(0.059) (0.035) (0.058) (0.045) (0.127) (0.035) (0.126) (0.045) 
pop (log) 0.123 
0.359**
* -0.253*** 0.003 -0.083 
0.359**
* -0.517*** 0.003 
 
(0.126) (0.065) (0.084) (0.083) (0.273) (0.065) (0.182) (0.083) 
rule_of_law 0.103*** -0.050** 0.091*** 
-
0.108**
* 0.291*** -0.050** 0.268*** 
-
0.108**
* 
 
(0.030) (0.021) (0.030) (0.027) (0.065) (0.021) (0.066) (0.027) 
pop65_log -0.139 -0.055 -0.166* -0.105 0.861*** -0.055 0.828*** -0.105 
 
(0.090) (0.068) (0.088) (0.087) (0.196) (0.068) (0.190) (0.087) 
corruption_control -0.046* -0.033* -0.021 -0.010 0.109** -0.033* 0.139*** -0.010 
 
(0.025) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.054) (0.017) (0.051) (0.022) 
Observations 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
R-squared 0.576  0.598  0.457  0.491  
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
F test for 
instruments 55.14   77.98   55.14   77.98   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 10: 2SLS results for government size and effectiveness with two additional control variables 
 
